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CRIMINAL LAW—RUSH TO JUDGMENT: ARKANSAS’S TROUBLING 
INTERPRETATION OF DNA STATUTORY LAW 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Some murders are punishable by death.1 But imagine a person found 
guilty of capital murder and sent away to live out the remaining days of life 
on death row. Though the person may understand that the appellate process 
moves slowly, the person is eager to prove innocence,2 but the State will not 
recognize any new scientific evidence brought forth.3 
This scenario is appalling, but it is a true story told by a witness to the 
criminal justice system which, while built to punish the guilty, is a man-
made construct capable of error.4 People sitting on Arkansas’s death row 
have committed brutal murders, but true stories of powerlessness to prove 
innocence serve as cautionary tales that show why there is an affirmative 
duty to review these cases.5 
In 2001, the Arkansas General Assembly passed a law allowing capital 
defendants to prove innocence.6 The Supreme Court of Arkansas has offered 
a faithful interpretation of that law’s codified statute,7 so it is troubling that 
no individual in Arkansas has been exonerated where DNA evidence was 
central to proving innocence.8 This note argues for a plain meaning interpre-
 
 1. In a political climate wrought with moral posturing, this note is meant to offer legal 
arguments regarding the implementation of statutory law in Arkansas concerning DNA evi-
dence. This note is not meant to offer any arguments pertaining to the wisdom of having the 
death penalty in the State of Arkansas. See Kansas v. Marsh, 548 U.S. 163, 187 (Scalia, J. 
concurring) (“There exists in some parts of the world sanctimonious criticism of America’s 
death penalty, as somehow unworthy of a civilized society.”). 
 2. “Innocent” meaning free from guilt. Innocent, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 
2014). 
 3. See infra Part II–III. 
 4. See North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 36–40 (1970) (affirming that there are 
constitutional limits preventing a judge from accepting a guilty plea from a defendant who 
wants to plead guilty while still maintaining innocence). See generally DAMIEN ECHOLS, LIFE 
AFTER DEATH (2013). Echols is still a convicted murderer. 
 5. Robbins v. State, 339 Ark. 379, 382, 5 S.W.3d 51, 53 (1999). See also ECHOLS, 
supra note 4. 
 6. ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 16-112-201 to -208 (West, Westlaw through 2018). 
 7. See Echols v. State, 2010 Ark. 417, at 9–10, 373 S.W.3d 892, 899. 
 8. E-mail from Vanessa Meterko, Research Analyst, Innocence Project Comm’n, to 
author (Sept. 9, 2017, 2:58 PM) (on file with author). 
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tation of the Arkansas DNA statutes9 and a more explicit standard favorable 
to innocence in light of recent technological advancement.10 
This note first discusses flaws in the forensic science used to secure 
convictions and advances in that science used for exoneration today.11 Next, 
it argues for a plain meaning interpretation of the Arkansas DNA statutes in 
contradistinction to the State’s interpretation.12 Last, it identifies a powerful 
incentive for the State to keep capital murder convictions final despite newly 
available evidence.13 
II. BACKGROUND 
In February 2017, eight men on Arkansas death row were set to die in 
the span of four nights before the expiration of a key drug in a lethal injec-
tion cocktail.14 Hundreds of people came to the State Capitol to protest.15 
News of the executions raised questions about the state of capital punish-
ment in Arkansas and engendered moral and political posturing from those 
opposed to it.16 Prominent members of the Arkansas legal community have 
been outspoken on this subject—addressing cases involving capital punish-
ment and defendants’ attempts to acquire relief.17 
 
 9. ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 16-112-201 to -208. 
 10. See infra Part II–III. 
 11. See infra Part II. 
 12. See infra Part III. 
 13. ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 16-112-201 to -208; See infra Part III. See generally SAMUEL R. 
GROSS & MICHAEL SHAFFER, EXONERATIONS IN THE UNITED STATES, 1989 – 2012, at 1 (2012), 
https://www.law.umich.edu/special/exoneration/documents/exonerations_us_1989_2012_full
_report.pdf. 
 14. Liliana Segura, Arkansas Justice: Racism, Torture, and Botched Execution, 
INTERCEPT (Nov. 12, 2017, 9:22 AM), https://theintercept.com/2017/11/12/arkansas-death-
row-executions-kenneth-williams/. 
 15. See generally id. 
 16. See generally id. 
 17. Josephine Linker Hart & Guilford M. Dudley, Available Post-Trial Relief After a 
State Criminal Conviction When Newly Discovered Evidence Establishes “Actual Inno-
cence”, 22 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L. REV. 629, 629–30 (2000) (explaining that 
“[u]ndoubtedly, most Arkansans believe that a rational society would not acquiesce to a 
system of laws permitting incarceration or execution of innocent persons, and they are unlike-
ly to accept the proposition that our jurisprudence provides no remedy for innocent persons 
wrongfully imprisoned. However, in Arkansas, a person with newly discovered, incontrovert-
ible proof of actual innocence, discovered post-trial, has limited judicial recourse.”). Justice 
Josephine Linker Hart now sits on the Supreme Court of Arkansas. Associate Justice Jose-
phine L. Hart, Position 4, ARK. JUDICIARY, https://www.arcourts.gov/courts/supreme-
court/justices/associate-justice-josephine-l-hart-position-4 (last visited Oct. 7, 2018). See also 
Niraj Chokshi, False Confessions, Mistaken Witnesses, Corrupt Investigators: Why 139 In-
nocent People Went to Jail, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 14, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/
2018/03/14/us/convict-exonerations-2017.html (noting that, in 2017, at least 139 individuals 
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A. The Probative Value of DNA Evidence 
Death penalty cases are unique because these defendants, many of 
whom were convicted based upon—what has been discovered to be—faulty 
forensic science and eyewitness testimony, are fighting for their lives.18 In 
the wake of newly available scientific evidence, private measures and phil-
anthropic efforts have been employed to provide direct representation or 
assistance in post-conviction cases to prove innocence through DNA test-
ing.19 The Innocence Project is a helpful source for determining any given 
state’s treatment of newly discovered evidence.20 Vanessa Meterko, who is 
part of the Science & Research Department at the Innocence Project, wrote, 
“Unfortunately the Innocence Project doesn’t have any Arkansas cases in 
our database of DNA exonerees.”21 The Innocence Project tracks cases of 
official exoneration in which DNA was central to proving innocence.22 Pres-
 
in the United States were exonerated thanks to private efforts dedicated to freeing the wrong-
fully convicted). 
 18. See, e.g., Caldwell v. Mississippi, 472 U.S. 320, 329 (1985) (noting that the differ-
ence of the death penalty from all other forms of punishment is that it calls for increased 
scrutiny on federal grounds); Johnson v. State, 326 Ark. 430, 437–38, 934 S.W.2d 179, 182 
(1996) (a conviction with great reliance on the admission of a six-year-old’s hearsay evidence 
via a police officer’s testimony); Nooner v. State, 322 Ark. 87, 101–02, 907 S.W.2d 677, 
684–85 (1995) (a conviction relying heavily on identification testimony in lieu of direct evi-
dence); Bloodsworth v. State, 76 Md. App. 23, 33, 543 A.2d 382, 387 (1988) (a conviction 
based primarily on the basis of eyewitness identification); see also Furman v. Georgia, 408 
U.S. 238, 290 (Brennan, J., concurring) (“Death is truly an awesome punishment. The calcu-
lated killing of a human being by the State involves, by its very nature, a denial of the exe-
cuted person’s humanity . . . [T]he finality of death precludes relief.”); see also Craig M. 
Cooley, Reforming the Forensic Science Community to Avoid the Ultimate Injustice, 15 
STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 381, 382–83 (2004) (“[There is] increased attention directed toward 
the capital punishment system [which] can be directly attributed to its pitiable state. The 
capital punishment systems operating throughout the United States seldom operate in an 
efficient and fundamentally fair manner given that death sentences are frequently overturned 
for various constitutional reasons.”). 
 19. INNOCENCE PROJECT, https://www.innocenceproject.org/exonerate/ (last visited Oct. 
14, 2018); see also HENRY ROLLINS, BROKEN SUMMERS (2003) (ebook). Henry Rollins and 
other notable performers including Iggy Pop, the late Lemmy Kilmister of Motörhead, and 
Public Enemy’s Chuck D united for recording sessions and a subsequent tour to raise money 
for DNA testing previously untested in the West Memphis Three case. Id. at 235 (According 
to Rollins, the goal was facts, explaining that “[t]o pursue this end doesn’t make me in any 
way an advocate of harm to children or for those who harm them. . . . If you are convinced of 
the [West Memphis Three’s] guilt then you won’t have a problem with some evidence being 
tested, because if conclusive results are derived, it will only point to the ones presently incar-
cerated, thus anchoring your position in absolute truth.”). 
 20. E-mail from Vanessa Meterko, supra note 8. 
 21. Id. 
 22. See id. 
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ently, no one in Arkansas has been exonerated where post-conviction DNA 
evidence was central to establishing innocence.23 
Though Arkansas has fallen behind when it comes to exoneration, there 
are statistics revealing wrongful convictions nationwide.24 Since the first 
DNA exoneration in 1989, 362 individuals in the United States have been 
exonerated by DNA testing, twenty of whom served time on death row.25 
Organizations dedicated to freeing the innocent are burdened with numerous 
claims of innocence, prosecutors vehemently fighting these claims “to the 
hilt,” and appellate courts’ deference to the verdict entered.26 
 
 23. NAT’L REGISTRY OF EXONERATIONS, EXONERATIONS IN 2016, at 5 (2017), 
https://www.law.umich.edu/special/exoneration/documents/exonerations_in_2016.pdf (In 
2016, “[t]here were 166 exonerations in 2016, including 153 in 25 states and the District of 
Columbia, plus 10 federal cases, and 3 in Puerto Rico. The states with the most exonerations 
are, in order: Texas, Illinois, New York, California, North Carolina, Oregon, Pennsylvania, 
Michigan, Oklahoma, and Virginia.”); see also Samuel R. Gross, The Staggering Number of 
Wrongful Convictions in America, WASH. POST (July 24, 2015), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/the-cost-of-convicting-the-innocent/2015/07/24/
260fc3a2-1aae-11e5-93b7-5eddc056ad8a_story.html?utm_term=.fdd80f203513 (“[These] 
cases are fascinating and important, but [haunting]: So many of them are stories of destruc-
tion and defeat.”). 
 24. NAT’L REGISTRY OF EXONERATIONS, supra note 23, at 2–3, 17–18 (case by case 
statistical gathering of exonerations in which eighty-four exonerations involved pernicious 
conduct by the state, eighty-seven included perjury or a false accusation, and noting “DNA 
exonerations now account for 21% of the exonerations in the Registry through 2017 
(459/2,161)”); see Robert Barnes, Supreme Court Confronts Conflicting Laws on Post-
Conviction DNA Testing, WASH. POST (Feb. 14, 2011, 12:29 AM), 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2011/02/13/AR2011021303415.html 
(discussing Dallas County District Attorney Craig Watkins organization of a special unit for 
DNA testing, which, in the span of four years, exonerated twenty-one men convicted in the 
Dallas area through DNA testing). 
 25. Access to Post-Conviction DNA Testing, INNOCENCE PROJECT, 
https://www.innocenceproject.org/access-post-conviction-dna-testing/ (last visited Nov. 5, 
2017) (“Some laws present insurmountable hurdles to the individual seeking access, putting 
the burden on the wrongfully convicted person to effectively solve the crime and prove that 
the DNA evidence promises to implicate another individual.”); see, e.g., Skinner v. Switzer, 
562 U.S. 521 (2011) (after exhausting all available avenues of relief, the defendant was less 
than an hour from entering the death chamber when the Texas Supreme Court stayed his 
execution to consider possible due process issues by state courts which opted not to provide 
ways to compel the State to conduct DNA testing on the critical evidence used to convict 
him). 
 26. NAT’L REGISTRY OF EXONERATIONS, supra note 23, at 17–18 (“We may well contin-
ue to see record numbers of exonerations in years to come. The room for growth is essentially 
unlimited. The mass of innocent defendants who could be helped dwarfs the help that is 
available.”). Those working toward a wider acceptance of exoneration have a long fight 
ahead of them. 
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Wrongful convictions have become an incentive for reform of the crim-
inal justice system.27 Kirk Bloodsworth was the first death row inmate to be 
exonerated through DNA evidence.28 Convicted in 1984 for the horrific kill-
ing of a child, he spent eight years on Maryland death row.29 After he gained 
his freedom, the Kirk Bloodsworth Postconviction DNA Testing Grant Pro-
gram became law.30 This competitive grant program provides funding to 
states “to help defray the costs associated with postconviction DNA test-
ing.”31 
B. Scientific Development and the Arkansas DNA Statutes 
This section will first examine the past faults of forensic science and 
eyewitness testimony which the present-day criminal justice system should 
recognize.32 Next, it will look at Arkansas statutory law enacted in light of 
scientific advancement capable of showing innocence.33 
 
 27. Gross, supra note 23 (“We can do better, of course—for misdemeanors, for death 
penalty cases and for everything in between—if we’re willing to foot the bill. It’ll cost money 
to achieve the quality of justice we claim to provide: to do more careful investigations, to 
take fewer quick guilty pleas and conduct more trials, and to make sure those trials are well 
done. But first we have to recognize that what we do now is not good enough.”). 
 28. Bloodsworth v. State, 76 Md. App. 23, 33, 543 A.2d 382, 387 (1988) (convicting 
Kirk Bloodsworth of the crime of murder primarily on the basis of eyewitness identification). 
Bloodsworth was later exonerated via DNA testing in 1993. See Kirk Bloodsworth, 
INNOCENCE PROJECT, https://www.innocenceproject.org/cases/kirk-bloodsworth/ (last visited 
Oct. 14, 2018); see also Gregory Bayne, Bloodsworth: Kirk Bloodsworth Tells His Story, 
YOUTUBE (Nov. 3, 2011), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=qjAOw-n3CxQ. At approxi-
mately 2:30 PM on July 24, 1984, the body of nine-year-old Dawn Hamilton was found dead 
lying face down in a pile of leaves. Id. This is the crime an honorably discharged marine with 
no criminal record was charged with. Id. Bloodsworth later remarked, “When that 400-pound 
door slammed shut like the tailgate off of a dump truck, my life was over.” Id. 
 29. Kirk Bloodsworth, supra note 28. 
 30. 34 U.S.C. § 40727 (2018). 
 31. Id. (authorizing $10,000,000 to be appropriated from 2017 through 2021 to carry out 
the goals of the statute); see also 34 U.S.C. § 40724 (2018) (creating grants for research and 
advancement for purposes of improving forensic DNA technology “including increasing the 
identification accuracy and efficiency of DNA analysis, decreasing time and expense, and 
increasing portability”). 
 32. See Cooley, supra note 18, at 388 (“The point is that the American public, if not the 
world, is being perpetually inundated with distorted perceptions of forensic science’s capabil-
ities.”). 
 33. Act of Apr. 19, 2001, No. 4, sec. 1, 2001 Ark. Acts 1780 (codified at ARK. CODE 
ANN. § 16-112-201 (2018)) (providing remedies for innocent persons who may be exonerated 
through DNA evidence). 
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1. Faulty Evidence’s Role in Wrongful Conviction 
Over recent decades, advancements in science and technology have 
proven that numerous capital convictions have been based on faulty science 
and unreliable eyewitness testimony.34 The Supreme Court has held that 
DNA testing’s ability to link an individual to a crime should be considered 
highly reliable35 and over the past twenty-five years, as the use of DNA test-
ing has become commonplace, the courts have had to adapt.36 
Since the landmark case Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, 
Inc., there has been a change in the judicial gatekeeping of novel scientific 
evidence.37 In Arkansas, many years before Daubert, expert testimony was 
 
 34. See Michael J. Saks, Banishing Ipse Dixit: The Impact of Kumho Tire on Forensic 
Identification Science, 57 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 879, 879 (2000) (protesting the shoddy sci-
ence that has been offered to courts, “for much of the twentieth century, the courts readily 
admitted these fields, apparently because they were flying the banner of science and not 
because they presented sound data supporting their claims.” Eyewitness testimony has also 
been found to be unreliable.); see Gross, supra note 23; see, e.g., Bloodsworth v. State, 76 
Md. App. 23, 33, 543 A.2d 382, 387 (1988) (revealing a greater understanding of the me-
chanics of memory that may not be intuitive to a layperson, and holding that trial courts 
should recognize these scientific advances in exercising their discretion whether to admit 
such expert testimony in a particular case); see also Samuel R. Gross et al., Rate of False 
Conviction of Criminal Defendants Who Are Sentenced to Death, 111 NAT’L ACAD. OF SCI. 
7230, 7233 (2014) (showing that 4.1% of those sentenced to death in the United States are 
later shown to be innocent. That is 1 in 25 people). But see United States v. Brownlee, 454 
F.3d 131, 141–42 (3d Cir. 2006) (“The recent availability of post-conviction DNA tests 
demonstrate that there have been an overwhelming number of false convictions stemming 
from uninformed reliance on eyewitness misidentifications . . . . ‘[E]yewitness evidence 
presented from well-meaning and confident citizens is highly persuasive but, at the same 
time, is among the least reliable forms of evidence.’” (quoting A. Daniel Yarmey, Expert 
Testimony: Does Eyewitness Memory Research Have Probative Value for the Courts?, 42 
CANADIAN PSYCHOL. 92, 93 (2001))); but see Johnson v. State, 326 Ark. 430, 934 S.W.2d 
179 (1996) (convicted on great reliance of the testimony of a six-year-old). 
 35. Dist. Attorney’s Office for the Third Judicial Dist. v. Osborne, 557 U.S. 52, 73–74 
(2009) (holding that DNA testing has the ability to exonerate the innocent, identify guilty 
parties, and effectively improve the criminal justice system as a whole). 
 36. Emily West & Vanessa Meterko, Innocence Project: DNA Exonerations, 1989-
2014: Review of Data and Findings from the First 25 Years, 76 ALA. L. REV. 717, 717 (2016) 
(“During the last quarter century there have been 325 DNA exonerations in the United States 
(1989-2014). What seemingly started out as a few tragic examples of wrongful convictions 
has turned into a growing body of cases (and individuals), allowing for deep investigation 
and research to determine why these injustices occur and how they might be prevented.”); see 
also Osborne, 557 U.S. at 55 (noting that the criminal justice system, at both the state and 
federal levels, has developed unique approaches ensuring that DNA evidence can be assimi-
lated). 
 37. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 597 (1993) (holding that scien-
tific evidence must be based on scientific principles); see, e.g., United States v. Starzecpyzel, 
880 F. Supp. 1027, 1036 (S.D.N.Y. 1995) (holding that were forensic document examination, 
for example, applied to the scrutiny of Daubert, it would be excluded). 
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held admissible based solely on the judge’s discretion.38 Change came in 
1991 with Prater v. State, which opted for a “relevancy approach” as a 
standard for admitting novel scientific evidence.39 However, there is key 
language absent from the “reliability” prong of the approach.40 Under Prat-
er, the governing law at the time of the convictions relevant to this note, a 
proponent may present novel scientific evidence without having to demon-
strate whether the science has a proven track record.41 
This language has caused numerous problems when presenting scien-
tific evidence in court. For example, expert testimony on forensic identifica-
tion, while found to be faulty in recent years, has been a very powerful form 
of evidence to secure convictions.42 Expert witnesses have a tendency to 
exaggerate, and the medical examiner is sometimes just another arm of the 
prosecution.43 Examples include testimony suggesting a group of character-
 
 38. Ratton v. Busby, 230 Ark. 667, 674, 326 S.W.2d 889, 894 (1959); see also Lee v. 
Crittenden County, 216 Ark. 480, 226 S.W.2d 79, 81–82 (1950). In Lee, Crittenden County, 
Arkansas sued the defendant for damages when his elevator shaft struck a radio tower owned 
by the county. Id. at 481, 226 S.W.2d at 80. The trial court allowed a witness with less than 
two years of general experience in the area of constructing towers to testify. Id. at 483, 226 
S.W.2d at 81. 
 39. Prater v. State, 307 Ark. 180, 186, 820 S.W.2d 429, 431 (1991). This approach under 
Prater “requires that the trial court conduct a preliminary inquiry which must focus on (1) the 
reliability of the novel process used to generate the evidence, (2) the possibility that admitting 
the evidence would overwhelm, confuse or mislead the jury, and (3) the connection between 
the novel process evidence to be offered and the disputed factual issues in the particular 
case.” Id., 820 S.W.2d at 431. 
 40. United States v. Downing, 753 F.2d 1224, 1238–39 (3d Cir. 1985) (identifying two 
variables that merely “bear upon” reliability: (1) the frequency of a technique leading to 
incorrect results and (2) judicial notice of subsequent expert testimony disputing the merits of 
a particular scientific methodology). 
 41. See Davasher v. State, 308 Ark. 154, 158, 823 S.W.2d 863, 866 (1992) (rejecting 
defendant’s argument that the scientific methodology, dog bite identification, used by an 
expert witness to secure the capital conviction had no general acceptance in science by simp-
ly reasoning that it was similar enough to human bite identification and that it was, therefore, 
reliable). 
 42. See Ex parte Robbins, 478 S.W.3d 678, 680 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014). In Robbins, a 
medical examiner reevaluated her testimony and opinion offered by the State of Texas at the 
original trial that a child’s death was a homicide and stated that she could no longer stand by 
that testimony. Id. The testimony was relied on by the State of Texas as “scientific 
knowledge.” Id. at 692. The court found, “on the preponderance of the evidence that, had this 
testimony by the medical examiner been presented at trial, the defendant would not have been 
convicted.” Id. See also Knowledge, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014) (defining 
“scientific knowledge” as “knowledge that is grounded on scientific methods that have been 
supported by adequate validation.”). 
 43. Joseph Sanders, Science, Law, and the Expert Witness, 72 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 
64, 74–75 (2009) (citing a survey of experts showing that the vast majority agreed with the 
statement that attorneys often manipulate their experts to weaken unfavorable testimony and 
create favorable testimony and showing that experts abandon objectivity and become a re-
source for the state). 
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istics are unique, overstating how rare or unusual it would be to view these 
characteristics, implying that it is likely that the accused person is the source 
of the evidence, and testimony that fails to offer all possible conclusions.44 
Sometimes forensic testimony even omits the significance of an analy-
sis establishing that a person should be excluded as a suspect in a given 
case.45 One example is testimony establishing that a certain analysis is “in-
conclusive” when in actuality, the analysis excluded the accused.46 Moreo-
ver, in some scenarios, this type of testimony fails to include limitations of 
the methodology used in the analysis, “such as the method’s error rates and 
situations in which the method has, and has not, been shown to be valid.”47 
The first major scientific institution to investigate the problems with fo-
rensic science across a broad spectrum was the National Academy of Sci-
ences (NAS).48 In a report released in 2009, the NAS found that “imprecise 
or exaggerated expert testimony has sometimes contributed to the admission 
of erroneous or misleading evidence.”49 Additionally, NAS noted that some 
forensic techniques, particularly those that deal with comparing patterns or 
features, have not been subjected to adequate scientific scrutiny.50 
More concerns regarding the validity of modern forensic science were 
expounded upon in another report by the President’s Council of Advisors on 
Science and Technology (PCAST).51 PCAST examined the research under-
lying specific forensic feature comparison disciplines, evaluated their accu-
racy and reliability, and made recommendations to various federal agencies 
to strengthen forensic disciplines.52 The most comprehensive review of fo-
rensics and its scientific validity in criminal law and procedure came in 
2009 with a report by the National Research Council (NRC).53 
 
 44. Misapplication of Forensic Science, INNOCENCE PROJECT, 
https://www.innocenceproject.org/causes/misapplication-forensic-science/ (last visited Oct. 
15, 2017). 
 45. Id. 
 46. Id. 
 47. Id. 
 48. COMM. ON IDENTIFYING THE NEEDS OF THE FORENSIC SCI. CMTY. ET AL., 
STRENGTHENING FORENSIC SCI. IN THE U.S.: A PATH FORWARD 1 (2009) [hereinafter 
STRENGTHENING FORENSIC SCI.]; see also PRESIDENT’S COUNCIL OF ADVISORS ON SCI. AND 
TECH., EXEC. OFF. OF THE PRESIDENT, FORENSIC SCI. IN CRIM. CTS: ENSURING SCI. VALIDITY 
OF FEATURE-COMPARISON METHODS 1 (2016) [hereinafter PRESIDENT’S COUNCIL OF 
ADVISORS]. 
 49. STRENGTHENING FORENSIC SCI., supra note 48, at 4. 
 50. See id.; see, e.g., Davasher v. State, 308 Ark. at 158, 823 S.W.2d at 866 (1992) 
(holding that comparison methodology for a dog bite mark was reliable). 
 51. PRESIDENT’S COUNCIL OF ADVISORS, supra note 48, at 1. 
 52. Id. at 2. 
 53. STRENGTHENING FORENSIC SCI., supra note 48, at 43; see also PRESIDENT’S COUNCIL 
OF ADVISORS, supra note 48. 
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The report revealed an unsettling pattern of defects common to many 
forensic methods routinely used in the justice system: most notably a dearth 
of rigorous studies establishing their scientific validity.54 The report further 
concluded that a large amount of forensic evidence is introduced in the 
courtrooms of criminal cases absent any meaningful scientific validation.55 
The NRC concluded that a sizable number of scientists in the field of 
criminal forensics do not meet the fundamental requirements of science.56 
Additionally, PCAST agreed with that finding and noted, “[E]xpert witness-
es have often overstated the probative value of their evidence, going far be-
yond what the relevant science can justify.”57 Generally, PCAST concluded 
that there are two important gaps in the nation’s legal system: (1) a need for 
more clarity in the standards used for the validity of forensic methods and 
(2) a need to ensure that specific forensic methods have been scientifically 
established.58 
Both legal and lay comprehensions of forensic science are rife with 
falsehoods. For instance, the phrase: “[t]o a reasonable degree of scientific 
certainty,” commonly used in criminal trials and popular crime T.V. shows, 
“has no generally accepted meaning” within the scientific community.59 
Among the hundreds of convictions invalidated through DNA testing since 
1989, the Innocence Project has found that forty-five percent of those cases 
involved misapplication of forensic science.60 Furthermore, between the 
1970s and 1990s, there were 268 cases where hair analysis done by the FBI 
led to a conviction and ninety-six percent of these cases utilized flawed fo-
 
 54. STRENGTHENING FORENSIC SCI., supra note 48, at 4. 
 55. Id. at 107–08; see, e.g., United States v. Green, 405 F. Supp. 2d 104, 109 (D. Mass. 
2005) (acknowledging that toolmark identification testimony, without requiring documenta-
tion, proficiency testing, or evidence showing reliability, ought not to be considered lest the 
shoddy forensic practices will continue). See generally Cooley, supra note 18, at 381 (“It 
seems that the only standard the courts are requiring of forensic science is that it be incrimi-
nating to the defendant.”). 
 56. STRENGTHENING FORENSIC SCI., supra note 48, at 43. “Acceptance of the work 
comes as results and theories continue to hold, even under the scrutiny of peers, in an envi-
ronment that encourages healthy skepticism. . . . As credibility accrues to data and theories, 
they become accepted as established fact and become the ‘scaffolding’ upon which other 
investigations are constructed.” Id. at 112. 
 57. PRESIDENT’S COUNCIL OF ADVISORS, supra note 48, at 3. 
 58. Id. at x (concluding that measures could be taken to reinforce the “scientific under-
pinnings” of the current forensic science used in the courtroom). 
 59. Id. at 30. 
 60. Overturning Wrongful Convictions Involving Flawed Forensics, INNOCENCE 
PROJECT, https://www.innocenceproject.org/overturning-wrongful-convictions-involving-
flawed-forensics/ (last visited Oct. 14, 2018). 
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rensics testimony.61 Hauntingly, by the time of this discovery, nine of the 
defendants in those cases had already been executed.62 
DNA analysis is a new development which led to serious inquiry into 
the validity of convictions and the forensic science used to secure them.63 
After DNA evidence was declared inadmissible in People v. Castro in 
1989,64 the scientific community and the FBI banded together to develop 
better standards which have led to DNA evidence becoming the most relia-
ble scientific evidence used in the courtroom.65 
2. The Arkansas DNA Statutes 
During its regular session in early 2001, the Arkansas General Assem-
bly enacted a bill recognizing that “Arkansas laws and procedures should be 
changed in order to accommodate the advent of new technologies enhancing 
the ability to analyze scientific evidence.”66 The Act, intended to exonerate 
the innocent, passed when DNA testing was gaining national recognition.67 
Theorists disagree with the prevailing interpretation in Arkansas re-
garding the issue of materially relevant DNA evidence.68 The conflict con-
 
 61. Id. 
 62. Michael P. Kortan, FBI Testimony on Microscopic Hair Analysis Contained Errors 
in at Least 90 Percent of Cases in Ongoing Review, FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION (Apr. 20, 
2015), https://www.fbi.gov/news/pressrel/press-releases/fbi-testimony-on-microscopic-hair-
analysis-contained-errors-in-at-least-90-percent-of-cases-in-ongoing-review. 
 63. PRESIDENT’S COUNCIL OF ADVISORS, supra note 48, at 25. 
 64. 545 N.Y.S.2d 985, 999 (Sup. Ct. 1989) (holding that DNA evidence was not admis-
sible in criminal court because the standards utilized by the crime lab were faulty). 
 65. See PRESIDENT’S COUNCIL OF ADVISORS, supra note 48, at 25–26 (“Once DNA anal-
ysis became a reliable methodology, the power of the technology—including its ability to 
analyze small samples and to distinguish between individuals—made it possible not only to 
identify and convict true perpetrators but also to clear mistakenly accused suspects before 
prosecution and to re-examine a number of past convictions.”). 
 66. Act of Apr. 19, 2001, No. 4, sec. 1, 2001 Ark. Acts 1780, 1780 (codified at ARK. 
CODE ANN. § 16-112-201 (2018)) (providing methods for preserving DNA and other scien-
tific evidence and providing a remedy for innocent persons who may be exonerated by this 
evidence). 
 67. Id.; see also URBAN INST., POST-CONVICTION DNA TESTING & WRONGFUL 
CONVICTION 10–11 (2012), https://www.urban.org/sites/default/files/publication/25506/
412589-Post-Conviction-DNA-Testing-and-Wrongful-Conviction.PDF (tracing the roots of 
DNA evidence as an investigative tool back to 1985. A 1983 survey showed that over 200 
crime labs in the U.S. were analyzing hair, semen, and blood, but that by 2002, a similar 
survey revealed a dramatic transformationover 350 labs were now delving into DNA anal-
ysis). 
 68. ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-112-202(c)(1)(B) (requiring that the DNA evidence presented 
be materially relevant to the defendant’s assertion of actual innocence). Compare 
PRESIDENT’S COUNCIL OF ADVISORS, supra note 48, at 26 (stating that once DNA was estab-
lished as a reliable methodology, it became possible to not only identify true culprits, but also 
to clear the wrongfully convicted), with Echols v. State, 2010 Ark. 417, at 8, 373 S.W.3d 892, 
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cerns weighing the public’s interest in keeping capital convictions final and 
the defendant’s interest in having the ability to prove innocence. As men-
tioned, during the 1980s, testing capable of proving factual innocence was 
developed.69 The case law discussed in this note concerns defendants who 
were tried and convicted before the advent of this new testing.70 Thus, evi-
dence not otherwise available at an original trial can, once available, become 
new evidence for purposes of acquiring relief.71 In Arkansas, a defendant 
may be granted a hearing if the petitioner can show, among other factors, 
that a new method of evidence testing exists, that a new method is substan-
tially more probative than the testing available at the time of the conviction, 
or that there is some other good cause.72 
Since Arkansas’s passage of its own DNA statutory law, the State has 
maintained an interpretation that ensures no one can succeed.73 Though the 
Supreme Court of Arkansas disagrees with the interpretation from the Ar-
kansas Attorney General’s Office in Echols v. State, the State’s interpreta-
tionlimiting evidence under the DNA Statutes to evidence of guiltis 
prevailing; no individual has succeeded in finding relief through the Arkan-
 
897 (the State argued that DNA evidence does not have the ability to prove guilt conclusive-
ly). 
 69. Barnes, supra note 24. 
 70. See infra Section III.A; see, e.g., King v. State, 2013 Ark. 133, at 4, 2013 WL 
1279079, at *3; Johnson v. State, 356 Ark. 534, 546, 157 S.W.3d 151, 161 (2004); see also 
Doug Plank, Convicted Defendants’ Access to DNA Evidence, NAT’L LEGAL RES. GROUP, 
INC.: CRIM. L. BLOG (Mar. 16, 2011, 12:03 PM), http://www.nlrg.com/criminal-law-legal-
research/bid/55495/Convicted-Defendants-Access-to-DNA-Evidence. 
 71. Barnes, supra note 24; see, e.g., King, 2013 Ark. 133, at 45, 2013 WL 1279079, at 
*3 (holding that DNA testing is authorized under Arkansas statutory law if the testing can 
provide materially relevant evidence that will significantly advance defendant’s claim of 
actual innocence in light of all evidence presented at the original trial). 
 72. See, e.g., King, 2013 Ark. 133, at 56, 2013 WL 1279079, at *3 (holding that, “with 
respect to the fingerprint evidence” used to convict the defendant, defendant “did not demon-
strate that the technology was substantially more probative than technology available when 
he was convicted” in 1998). But see Michael J. Saks, Banishing Ipse Dixit: The Impact of 
Kumho Tire on Forensic Identification Science, 57 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 879, 881 (2000) 
(arguing that forensic identification science, like fingerprinting, has no basic science to sup-
port them: “Once one appreciates the weaknesses of the bases of forensic identification sci-
ence, one can better understand why the casualness of judges admitting these fields creates a 
serious problem . . . .”). 
 73. Echols v. State, 2010 Ark. 417, at 1516, 373 S.W.3d 892, 902. In Echols, it was 
unclear to the Arkansas Supreme Court how DNA test results alone could ever prove inno-
cence under the State’s interpretation of the DNA statutes. Id. at 9, 373 S.W.3d at 899. The 
court then declined the invitation to interpret the statutes in this way, noting, “it would render 
them meaningless.” Id. at 10, 373 S.W.3d at 899. 
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sas DNA Statutes.74 The discord is palpable, especially in light of recent 
events in the state.75 
III. ARGUMENT 
The State of Arkansas credits DNA evidence little probative value, and 
any chance for an evidentiary hearing is blocked by an inexplicable statutory 
interpretation,76 which is clearly visible in the State’s argument in the Echols 
case.77 This section of the note will begin with an explanation of the Su-
preme Court of Arkansas’s holding regarding the use of DNA to exonerate 
the innocent and, despite a faithful statutory interpretation, why no exonera-
tions through DNA in Arkansas have come to pass.78 Next, the note will 
examine the Arkansas Attorney General’s argument in Echols v. State to 
keep capital convictions final despite the advances in forensic science used 
to secure them.79 
When Damien Echols, one of three individuals convicted and sent to 
death row for the 1993 murders of three West Memphis second graders, 
brought newly available DNA evidence showing actual innocence to the 
Supreme Court of Arkansas, the State argued that DNA evidence alone does 
not have the ability to prove innocence conclusively, that review of the ap-
pellant’s case pursuant to Ark. Code Ann. § 16-112-201 et seq. should be 
limited to evidence of guilt, and that no relief should be granted to the de-
fendant in the interests of finality in a criminal conviction.80 
 
 74. Id. at 1214, 373 S.W.3d at 90001. The State argued that, without testing results 
dispositive of the identity of the true perpetrator, appellant cannot raise a reasonable probabil-
ity that he was not the perpetrator and despite this argument, the State failed to offer any 
examples of a scenario when DNA could identify a true killer. Id. at 910, 373 S.W.3d at 
899. See NAT’L REGISTRY OF EXONERATIONS, supra note 23 (showing no exonerations in 
Arkansas where DNA was central to proving innocence). 
 75. Segura, supra note 14 (noting that in April 2017, Arkansas became a highly publi-
cized death penalty state). 
 76. See, e.g., Carter v. State, 2015 Ark. 57, at 36, 536 S.W.3d 123, 12526 (holding the 
circuit court erred in denying defendant’s motion for postconviction forensic DNA testing 
pursuant to ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 16-112-201 to 208 (2018) because the circuit court erred in 
failing to hold an evidentiary hearing under ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-112-205(a) to determine 
whether defendant satisfied the chain-of-custody requirements of ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-112-
202(4)); Aaron v. State, 2010 Ark. 249, at 1–4, 2010 WL 2006568, at *12 (holding that the 
defendant, who filed a pro se motion for DNA testing sixteen years after his conviction at 
trial, did not include in the motion a showing that the new technology available is substantial-
ly more probative than prior testing available at the time of the original trial). 
 77. Echols, 2010 Ark. 417, at 15–16, 373 S.W.3d at 902 (holding that both the State’s 
and original trial court’s shared interpretation of the DNA statutes limiting evidence to only 
evidence of guilt was incorrect). 
 78. See infra Section III.A. 
 79. See infra Section III.B. 
 80. Echols, 2010 Ark. 417, at 910, 373 S.W.3d at 899. 
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A. Interpreting the Arkansas DNA Statutes in Light of Newly Available 
Scientific Evidence 
Conflicting interpretations of the DNA Statutes in Echols v. State 
hinged on Ark. Code Ann. § 16-112-208(e)(3) which states that a motion for 
a new trial may be granted if the results of the DNA testing, “when consid-
ered with all other evidence in the case regardless of whether the evidence 
was introduced at trial, establish[es] by compelling evidence that a new trial 
would result in an acquittal.”81 But the Arkansas Attorney General argued 
that DNA evidence showing innocence is never sufficient to establish actual 
innocence and that additional evidence is needed to attain relief under 
208(e)(3).82 The Attorney General also asserted that the “additional evi-
dence,” while required, is not permitted by law; that is, only evidence of 
guilt should be permitted.83 This view previously had been adopted by the 
original trial court in Echols’s case.84 In the trial court’s order denying relief, 
Judge David Burnett, agreeing with the Attorney General’s contention that 
newly available DNA evidence, along with abundant evidence gathered in 
the years since the convictions were entered, held that no new evidence is to 
be considered under Ark. Code Ann. § 16-112-208(e)(3).85 
As the Supreme Court of Arkansas has held, the cardinal rule in all 
statutory-construction issues is to give full effect to the will of the legisla-
 
 81. Id. at 11, 373 S.W.3d at 900 (quoting ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-112-208(e)(3) (2018)); 
see also Oral Argument at 6:00, Echols, 2010 Ark. 417, 373 S.W.3d 892 (No. CR08-1493), 
http://arkansas-sc.granicus.com/MediaPlayer.php?view_id=4&clip_id=71 [hereinafter Oral 
Argument] (explaining that the word “all” in this section is the focal point of the conflicting 
interpretations. The State construed “all” to mean all the evidence of guilt while Echols ar-
gued that “all other evidence” must mean the evidence presented at trial in addition to the 
evidence gathered in the seventeen years since the trial ended). 
 82. Oral Argument, supra note 81, at 7:15; see also Order Denying Petition for Writ of 
Habeas Corpus and Motion for New Trial Under ARK. CODE ANN § 16-112-201, et seq. at ¶ 
4, Baldwin v. State, No. CR 93-450 (Cir. Ct. of Craighead Cty., Ark. W.D. filed Sept. 10, 
2008) (on file with the Circuit Court Clerk of Craighead County, Arkansas, Western District) 
[hereinafter Order Denying Relief] (“Proof of actual innocence requires more than [defend-
ant’s] exclusion as the source of a handful of biological material that is not dispositive of the 
identity of a killer. As his DNA-testing results offer no more than that, they are inconclusive 
and cannot support a hearing to evaluate his assertion of actual innocence.”). 
 83. Oral Argument, supra note 81, at 7:00. 
 84. Id.; see also ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-112-201(a) (“[A] person convicted of a crime 
may commence a proceeding to secure relief by filing a petition in the court in which the 
conviction was entered to vacate and set aside the judgment and to discharge the petitioner or 
to resentence the petitioner or grant a new trial or correct the sentence or make other disposi-
tion as may be appropriate . . . .”). Review of the West Memphis Three’s request for relief, 
under the DNA statutes, rested on the trial court, assuming the original trial judge would be 
the best individual to review the case because he or she is the judge most familiar with the 
case to be reviewed. Oral Argument, supra note 81, at 7:00. 
 85. Order Denying Relief, supra note 82. 
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ture.86 Though the Supreme Court of Arkansas ruled in favor of Echols in 
2010, the Attorney General’s interpretation of evidentiary review under the 
DNA Statutes has not lost support in Arkansas’s highest court. Justice 
Rhonda K. Wood wrote in her dissent in the April 2017 appeals case John-
son v. State, “[W]e do not believe . . . that testing should be authorized re-
gardless of the slight chance it may yield a favorable result.”87 However, the 
standard set forth in the DNA Statutes says that the evidence tested need not 
entirely exonerate the defendant to be materially relevant; it need only tend 
to significantly advance the defendant’s claim of innocence.88 
It remains unclear how much probative value attained through modern 
DNA testing is needed for an appellant to attain a hearing under the DNA 
Statutes in Arkansas.89 In Echols, DNA testing exculpated all three convict-
ed men from the scene of the crime, but the evidence gathered from that 
testing never saw the inside of a courtroom despite the great efforts under-
gone to attain the evidence.90 Both before and since Echols no one has ever 
succeeded under the DNA Statutes.91 
In fighting so zealously against exoneration through DNA evidence, 
the State maintains a hyperbolic view of Arkansas’s justice system: 
The State does not shrink from [Echols’s] charge that relief may never be 
granted under its view of the statute, but embraces it out of confidence 
that the Arkansas criminal-justice system does not convict the innocent. 
It may be fashionable to believe otherwise, and certainly the statute rep-
 
 86. See State v. Pinell, 353 Ark. 129, 134, 114 S.W.3d 175, 178 (2003). 
 87. Johnson v. State, 2017 Ark. 138, at 2 (Wood, J., dissenting) (quoting Johnson v. 
State, 356 Ark. 534 536, 157, S.W.3d 151, 161 (2004)). 
 88. King v. State, 2013 Ark. 133, at 45, 2013 WL 1279079, at *3; see ARK. CODE ANN. 
§ 16-112-208(e)(3); see also Petitioner Damien Echols’s Motion for a New Trial at 53, Ech-
ols v. State, 2010 Ark. 417, 373 S.W.3d 892 (No. CR-93-450A) (“[T]he relevant question is 
this: is this a case where, had he or she heard all the evidence, including but not limited to the 
new DNA evidence described above, any reasonable juror would have a reasonable doubt as 
to petitioner’s guilt?”) (citing ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-112-208(e)(3)). See generally House v. 
Bell, 547 U.S. 518 (2006). 
 89. See, e.g., Cooper v. State, 2013 Ark. 180, at 3, 2013 WL 1776437, at *2 (per curiam) 
(holding that the evidence that defendant would have tested had already been previously held 
to have extremely low probative value by the court of appeals on direct appeal. Additionally, 
the defendant’s identification of an alternative perpetrator was not sufficient to make the 
requested testing any more probative. The language of 208(e)(3) plainly states the court must 
place on the scale not only evidence of guilt, but also all evidence which bears on the offens-
es. Under the State’s interpretation, if there is DNA evidence pointing to another individual 
and that person admits to the crime, a court cannot consider that the confession exists.). 
 90. Petitioner Damien Echols’s Motion for a New Trial, supra note 88, at 46–47. Such 
testing was conducted at Bode Laboratories in Virginia. Id. 
 91. Id. at 39 (“The Arkansas Supreme Court has yet to render a decision in which it 
applies the statutory scheme for obtaining a new trial based on new scientific evidence to a 
specific set of facts.”). 
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resents a legislative judgment that the possibility exists. Even still, the 
statutory correction of such a damnable wrong is available only on the 




The DNA Statutes passed amidst nationwide concerns that individuals were 
being sent to prison, even executed, for crimes they did not commit. Hence, 
in passing this statute, the Arkansas legislature was recognizing that the 
criminal justice system is sometimes imperfect, as are all human institutions. 
B. Finality of Judgments 
Uncertainty abounds in the doctrines of criminal law which are used to 
determine when, if ever, a conviction assumes finality.93 In death penalty 
cases, the principal argument against broadening defendants’ access to DNA 
testing to prove innocence is the endangerment of reliance on finality of 
judgments.94 But those in this camp, who argue for upholding the integrity 
of criminal trials, ignore the utility of newly available evidence to a point of 
irrationality.95 It would be difficult to find anyone who acts with malicious-
ness in sending an innocent person to death and someone who acts in bad 
faith in lessening a person’s ability to prove innocence.96 But as statistics 
and case law show, “the very people who are responsible for ensuring truth 
and justice—law enforcement officials and prosecutors—lose sight of these 
obligations and instead focus solely on securing convictions.”97 
 
 92. Response to Petitioner Baldwin’s Adoption of Echols’s Reply in Support of Motion 
for a New Trial, Baldwin v. State, No. CR 93-450B (Cir. Ct. of Craighead Cty., Ark. W.D. 
filed Aug. 29, 2008) (on file with the Circuit Court Clerk of Craighead County, Arkansas, 
Western District); see also Oral Argument, supra note 81 at 5:00. 
 93. If the criminal justice system’s success rate is to be tested by stacking overturned 
convictions based on DNA evidence against the number of felony convictions, the ratio 
would be permissibly negligible and qualms with our justice system should be stated particu-
larly. NAT’L REGISTRY OF EXONERATIONS, supra note 23, at 2–3, 1718 (2017). Compare 25 
Years of Wrongful Convictions: By the Numbers, WEEK (May 23, 2012), http://theweek.com/
articles/475332/25-years-wrongful-convictions-by-numbers (showing 2,000 wrongful convic-
tions since 1989), with Felony Sentences, BUREAU OF JUST. STAT., https://www.bjs.gov/
index.cfm?ty=tp&tid=233 (last visited Oct. 15, 2018) (showing an estimated 1.1 million 
persons convicted of a felony in state courts in 2006). 
 94. Plank, supra note 70. 
 95. See Keith A. Findley & Michael S. Scott, The Multiple Dimensions of Tunnel Vision 
in Criminal Cases, 2006 WIS. L. REV. 291, 348–53 (2006) (arguing that tunnel vision, intensi-
fied in the post-conviction process, leads prosecutors to focus on a specific conclusion and 
then filter all evidence in a case through the lens that conclusion creates). 
 96. INNOCENCE PROJECT, supra note 19. 
 97. Id. (explaining that the eye is most always on the prize: achieving a fair and just 
result); see Findley & Scott, supra note 95, at 328 (noting that prosecutors’ offices place 
significant importance and pride in conviction rates. Conviction rates are also regarded to be 
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1. The Meaning of Finality 
“Finality” can take on a number of different meanings and, as Associ-
ate Professor Aaron- Andrew P. Bruhl wrote, “[p]erhaps the safest answer, 
when it comes to litigation, is that it is never over, at least if we mean abso-
lutely and irretrievably over.”98 It follows that a case where the defendant 
has been sentenced to death reaches finality when the defendant is executed. 
Therefore, death penalty cases are not easily reconcilable with the doctrines 
of finality. According to Black’s Law Dictionary, a final judgment is “[o]ne 
which finally disposes of rights of parties, either upon entire controversy or 
upon some definite and separate branch thereof.”99 Furthermore, “Judgment 
is considered ‘final’ only if it determines the rights of the parties and dispos-
es of all the issues involved so that no future action by the court will be nec-
essary in order to settle and determine the entire controversy.”100 If it is at 
the imposition of a death sentence when all rights have been disposed of in a 
given case, then the finality Justice Brennan points to in his dissent in Fur-
man should not be ignored.101 
In Echols, the State asserted that the appellant’s goal under the statutes 
would undermine confidence in the outcome of the original trial.102 The 
State equated a remand to a retrial and argued that the DNA Statutes do not 
call for retrying cases every few years:103 The State contended that it would 
be remarkable if the statute’s animating purpose is to force the State to 
prove guilt again or re-weigh the credibility of the State’s proof of guilt.104 
 
a method for measuring the success of prosecutors); see also MODEL RULES OF PROF’L 
CONDUCT R. 3.8 cmt. 1 (AM. BAR ASS’N 1983) (giving a prosecutor not only the title of advo-
cate, but also a “minister of justice”). 
 98. Aaron-Andrew P. Bruhl, When Is Finality . . . Final? Rehearing and Resurrection in 
the Supreme Court, 12 J. APP. PRAC. & PROCESS 1, 1–2 (2011). “Now, finality is a word of 
many meanings, so one has to be careful in using it. The particular type of finality that con-
cerns us here is the finality that attaches when the direct appellate process has run its course. 
This type of finality is important because it marks the point at which a case outcome is no 
longer routinely subject to revision based on changes in the governing law. A case that is still 
on appeal is not yet final in this sense, and so an appellate court can reverse a trial court deci-
sion that was perfectly correct when rendered but that has become incorrect by the time of the 
appeal. After finality attaches, however, the judgment stands even if the law later changes.” 
Id.; see, e.g., FED. R. CIV. P. 60(b) (providing for reopening judgments in certain circum-
stances). 
 99. Final Judgment, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (5th ed. 1979). 
 100. Id. 
 101. Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 288 (1972) (Brennan, J., concurring) (“Death is 
truly an awesome punishment. The calculated killing of a human being by the State involves, 
by its very nature, a denial of the executed person’s humanity . . . [T]he finality of death 
precludes relief.”). 
 102. Oral Argument, supra note 81, at 23:00. 
 103. Id. 
 104. Id. 
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But there is no hinderance when the procedures are in place to at least in-
quire whether a wrong need be addressed, even if review defers to the 
judgment entered under the Arkansas Rules.105 Moreover, the procedure for 
a hearing is less formal than that of a trial, generally held publicly, with def-
inite issues of fact or of law to be tried.106 While it is much the same as a 
trial and may terminate a final order, “[t]he introduction and admissibility of 
evidence is usually more lax in a hearing than in a civil or criminal trial.”107 
Furthermore, the Supreme Court has consistently held that federal con-
stitutional protection requires greater procedural safeguards that may or may 
not be required in other cases in order to minimize the risk of arbitrariness 
and capriciousness in imposing death.108 
2. Procedural Safeguards in Place 
Not only should special sufferance be given to death row inmates in 
their appeals for relief in light of newly available DNA evidence, rules cur-
rently exist within the Arkansas Code indicating that deference should be 
given to compensate for other errors.109 Under Rule 10 of the Arkansas 
Rules of Appellate Procedure, even if a defendant sentenced to death waives 
her right of appeal, the Supreme Court will automatically conduct a review 
of the record for egregious and prejudicial errors.110 The Supreme Court of 
Arkansas noted in State v. Robbins: 
In capital offenses, for many years all errors of the lower court prejudi-
cial to the rights of appellant have been required to be heard and consid-
ered by this court and, if we found any prejudicial error by the trial court, 
this court was required to reverse and remand the cause for a new trial, 




 105. ARK. R. APP. P. CRIM. 1 (West 2018). 
 106. Hearing, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (5th ed. 1979). 
 107. Id. 
 108. See Woodward v. Alabama, 134 S. Ct. 405, 406 (2013) (recognizing that the penalty 
of death is different in kind from any other punishment imposed under our system of criminal 
justice (citing Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 286–91 (1972) (Brennan, J. concurring))); 
see also Murray v. Giarratano, 492 U.S. 1, 8–9 (1989) (Burger, C.J., concurring); see also 
Lockett v. Ohio, 439 U.S. 586, 605 (1978); see also Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 188 
(1976) (Stewart, Powell & Stevens, JJ., joint opinion). 
 109. ARK. R. APP. P. CRIM. 10(a) (allowing for special deference to an individual sen-
tenced to death: “[T]he circuit court shall order the circuit clerk to file a notice of appeal on 
behalf of the defendant . . . .”). 
 110. Id.; see State v. Robbins, 339 Ark. 379, 386, 5 S.W.3d 51, 55 (1999); see also Col-
lins v. State, 261 Ark. 195, 548 S.W.2d 106 (1977) (holding that the Arkansas judicial system 
has special broad powers to keep the impositions of the death penalty in check). 
 111. Robbins, 339 Ark. at 385, 5 S.W.3d at 54. 
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Rule 37.5 of the Arkansas Rules of Criminal Procedure provides in-
creased procedural rights for individuals sentenced to death in challenging 
their convictions. This includes the right to appoint specialized counsel to 
represent the inmate in the state post-conviction process, as opposed to the 
situation faced by inmates not sentenced to death in Rule 37.1.112 
3. Finality and Reaching a Fair and Just Result 
A court cannot be divine. In other words, a court can be wrong.113 In 
the interests of pursuing justice, the criminal justice system must be able to 
continue to ask whether the court applied the correct rule or made the cor-
rect decision.114 In order to adhere to the purpose of habeas corpus, the crim-
inal justice system “should come to terms with the possibility of error inher-
ent in any process.”115 Additionally, “The task of assuring legality is to de-
fine and create a set of arrangements and procedures which provide a rea-
soned and acceptable probability that justice will be done, that the facts 
found will be ‘true’ and the law applied ‘correct.’”116 
A convicted individual should not have limitless access to collateral 
proceedings permitted to disturb a resolution achieved through a painstaking 
criminal trial, but rather, sufferance should be given to that individual await-
 
 112. ARK. R. CRIM. P. 37.5 (recognizing that criminal defense attorneys remain under-
resourced and their clients find themselves with fewer and fewer avenues for relief, notably 
in post-conviction death penalty cases); see also United States v. Green, 405 F. Supp. 2d 104 
(D. Mass. 2005) (recognizing that when liberty is hanging in the balance and, in the case of 
those sentenced to death, life itself, the standards should be higher across the country); see 
also Andrew Hammel, Effective Performance Guarantees for Capital State Post-Conviction 
Counsel: Cutting the Gordian Knot, 5 J. APP. PRAC. & PROCESS 347, 348 (2003) (“[O]ne 
weak link in the chain of ‘super due process’ that is claimed to ensure reliable death sentenc-
es has received comparatively little public attention. Incompetent habeas corpus representa-
tion occurs all too frequently in death-penalty appeals--especially in Southern states, which 
are less than eager to spend public funds to ensure adequate representation to indigent in-
mates. The issue of incompetent habeas representation is not one for the masses: Understand-
ing the vital role post-conviction plays, and the arcane rules that control it, takes legal train-
ing. However, post-conviction proceedings are, after trial, perhaps the most common and 
effective means of forestalling substantive injustice in capital cases.”); see also ARK. R. 
CRIM. P. 37.1. 
 113. See Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 540 (1952) (Jackson, J., concurring in result) 
(“We are not final because we are infallible, but we are infallible only because we are fi-
nal.”). Finality is obviously important to the legal process because, absent finality there 
would be no way to know when the outcome of any legal process arrives. 
 114. Id. 
 115. Id. 
 116. Id. 
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ing execution.117 In 2017, after the Supreme Court of Arkansas granted death 
row inmate Stacey Johnson’s motion for stay of execution and remanded for 
a hearing on petitioner’s motion for postconviction DNA testing, Justice 
Rhonda K. Wood wrote in her dissenting opinion, “Today, our court gives 
uncertainty to any case ever truly being final in the Arkansas Supreme 
Court.”118 The room for error, arbitrary enforcement, and even ill will in any 
man-made institution is such that allowing a decision to re-weigh evidence 
in light of newly available scientific evidence showing innocence serves a 
role paramount for convicted individuals and the public confidence.119 
IV. CONCLUSION 
The rush to carry out judgment120 can never be reconciled with advanc-
es in technology. Though Arkansas precedent is sound, all interpretations, 
whether made by a court of general jurisdiction or an attorney for the State, 
should follow explicit available statutory schemes. Recent events in the 
State of Arkansas must serve as a reminder that the efforts made both inside 
and outside the criminal justice system furthering the interests of justice 
must not go unrecognized. The fruits of such efforts should garner the de-
sired effect in adherence to the will of the legislature. 
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